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Author's Note 
I first met Gelia Castillo when she was a member of the Board of Governors of the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), where I worked for several years as head of the 
economics program. One of the themes that ran through her commentaries was the need to 
ensure that the research we supported was used in decision making. On IDRC's Board, and on 
many others, she has continually reminded us that development research should be in the service 
of the poor and should result, not just in books and articles, but in social change. 
This paper attempts to respond to some of the questions Gelia has confronted us with: How can 
we improve communications between researchers and policymakers? What can be done to 
increase the utilization of research results? And how can research meet short term needs without 
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bureaucratic decision making impede a science-based approach and call for a style of policy 
research that takes greater account of political and administrative feasibility. At the same time, 
the importance of 'basic' social science research in defining problems and developing analytical 
concepts is affirmed. The paper concludes with recommendations for agencies financing 
research in developing countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s saw a heavy emphasis on economic policy making. As macroeconomic crises shifted 
attention from sectoral to national and international issues, the quality of policy making was 
given increased importance as a factor in promoting stabilization and growth. A frequent 
observation is that policy making could be substantially improved if it were based on better 
information and relied more on the principles of analysis and evaluation developed by 
economists and other social scientists. 
Current discussions of this subject in developing countries might benefit from an examination of 
the literature on research and policy making during an earlier period in the United States. Under 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the federal government launched ambitious social programs 
and at the same time attempted to increase the 'science base' of policy making. It attempted the 
latter by transferring a system of Planning, Programming and Budgetting from the Defense 
Department to other departments and by funding advisory and evaluative research related to 
those social programs. Subsequently, a wave of studies (most notably Weiss, 1977 and Lynn, 
1977) assessed the impact of that research. The findings were disappointing - social science 
appeared to have had little direct impact, measured by the direct adoption of specific 
recommendations. However, these studies did identify basic differences in the ways in which 
policy makers and academics analyze problems and make decisions. They also identified the 
more fundamental contributions of social science as 'research for knowledge' rather than 
'research for action'. 
This paper surveys that literature and highlights its importance for developing countries. It 
examines the differences between policy makers and researchers, and recommendations for 
overcoming those differences. It then critiques the recommendations and discusses alternative 
concepts of social science's impact. It concludes by examining the implications for agencies 
financing research in developing countries. 
'DEMAND-SIDE' PROBLEMS OF UTILIZATION: THE POLICY 
MAKING PROCESS 
Four aspects of the policy making process are frequently incompatible with the utilization of 
social science research: policy objectives, the timing of decisions, who takes decisions, and the 
decision-making process. 
Policy objectives. Rigorous analysis requires a clear definition of a problem and the variables to 
be measured. Government policies and programs are not often amenable to such analysis 
because they tend to have loosely defined and multiple, even contradictory, objectives. Stated 
and real objectives may differ. Furthermore, the relationship between means and ends is not 
simple. In policy making, as elsewhere in life, ends are not always chosen first. "Ends are 
chosen that are appropriate to available or nearly available means"; they are not fixed, but 
explored, reconsidered and modified (Hirschman and Lindblom, 1962). Finally, the pervasive 
role of government in society and the increased politicization of ethical issues (e.g. population 
policy, human rights, genetic engineering) have brought highly value-laden issues into the 
political arena; these are not easily amenable to research or evaluation (Rose, 1977). 
Timing. For a variety of reasons, the need for research often becomes apparent too late. Because 
of inertia and more urgent priorities, governments are usually not receptive to suggestions for 
improvements unless there is a serious and self-evident problem. They tend to think about 
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changing policies only when time and funding have run out; at that point, it is too late to carry 
out research (Wilson, 1978). 
Timing usually pre-empts evaluative research. New policies and programs are usually launched 
in a research vacuum, partly because ex ante appraisal techniques tend to be less reliable than 
those for ex post evaluation. The latter requires an existing program to study (Sundquist, 1978). 
Furthermore, it is only after a program has been established and a clientele created that an 
effective demand exists for research (Lynn, 1978). For these reasons, policy implementation 
tends to precede rather than follow research. 
Who makes decisions. The model of a researcher advising a decision maker applies only 
weakly. In most cases, decisions are arrived at through multilateral bargaining. Even in cases 
where a client agency requests advice, there is no guarantee that it will be the appropriate 
audience for the results (e.g. a study done for the Ministry of Education which finds that the 
principal bottleneck to better student performance is poor nutrition: Weiss, 1978). This problem 
has led some observers to recommend that policy analysis focus on a policy area rather than on 
specific agencies (Lamb, 1987), although it is not clear how this would be operationalized. 
Furthermore, policies are 'made', in varying degrees by many actors, including senior civil 
servants, technicians, advisers and technical assistants (sometimes foreign); it is incorrect to 
think that only cabinet ministers are 'policy makers'. Finally, (1977) many 'policies' are not the 
result of conscious decisions at all; they are simply the sum of previous ad hoc actions and 
inaction (Weiss, 1977). As a result of these conditions, it is often extremely difficult to identify a 
client for research. 
The decision making process. The loosely defined and often inconsistent objectives of many 
government policies result from the process by which they were formulated. In multilateral 
bargaining, it is often impossible to obtain consensus on anything more than broad statements of 
principle; accuracy and specificity must be sacrificed (Rose, 1977). Furthermore, these bargains 
would not hold up if the costs and tradeoffs involved were made explicit (Verdier, 1984) 
see note 1. Research that examines the ex ante feasibility or ex post achievement of objectives 
is thus extremely difficult, and analyses that highlight costs and tradeoffs are threatening. 
Research always has the potential to upset delicate agreements; to take debates out of political 
back rooms where they can be controlled by the actors involved (Verdier, 1984); and to 
generally reduce the freedom of policy makers who request studies and then find themselves 
under pressure to follow unwelcome recommendations (Davis and Salasin, 1978). 
Finally, there are practical problems that prevent decision makers from making better use of 
research. Often, governments are afflicted with too much information; attempts to absorb the 
data already available can delay and complicate decision making (Sharpe, 1977). Furthermore, 
most senior policy makers have very little time to read: the average US congressman works an 
eleven hour day, of which eleven minutes are spent reading (Verdier, 1984). 
DIFFERENCES IN THE LOGIC OF ECONOMISTS AND POLICY 
MAKERS 
Some of the objectives and values of economists are particularly divergent from those of 
policymakers. To the extent that their objectives are identifiable, policy makers tend to 
emphasize distributional concerns (i.e. winners and losers); economists emphasize efficiency. 
Policy makers tend to define goals in (sometimes arbitrary) quantitative terms rather than in 
financial terms, as economists do (e.g. reducing pollution by 25% rather than investing in 
pollution control up to the point that marginal returns equal marginal costs: Leman and Nelson, 
1981). 
In measuring the achievement of objectives, economists and policy markers also differ. Policy 
makers tend to assess costs and benefits in terms of the number of people affected, rather than 
financial costs and benefits (Verdier, 1984). Partly because of the vagueness of many program 
goals, they assess performance in terms of inputs rather than outputs (e.g. number of new 
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hospital beds rather than improvements in health: Behn, 1981). They also weigh losses more 
heavily than gains, since the credit accruing to the originator of the policy is asymmetrical. As 
Verdier (1984, p. 432) says, "a policy that hurts five people and helps five, produces five 
enemies and five ingrates". 
There are also differences in the decision making criteria employed by policy makers and those 
recommended by economists. While economists emphasize the future costs of a potential 
project, policy makers place much weight on sunk costs to justify further investment, since these 
reflect the amount of credibility the policy maker has invested, the size of the project's 
constituency and its expectations (Behn, 1981). Opportunity cost usually does not figure heavily 
in policy makers' calculations (Leman and Nelson, 1981); projects and programs are assessed in 
their own terms, without close reference to alternative uses of funds (particularly alternatives in 
areas outside the decision maker's control). Finally, the issue of compensation is critical to 
policy makers; for economists it is usually an afterthought. Economists tend to find a solution 
satisfactory if, in theory, the losers could be compensated. To push a policy innovation through, 
policy makers must usually ensure that they will be compensated, and have mechanisms to do 
so. 
Many sectoral ministries are also dominated by sectoral specialists (i.e. engineers controlling 
infrastructure policy; doctors controlling health policy). Economic analysis is often absent or 
done as an afterthought when financing is sought for the investment programs. 
The last area of divergence is in the means favoured to influence the behaviour of economic 
agents. In part because many policy makers have a background in law, they often favour legal 
and regulatory instruments (Rhoads, 1978). That is, they try to affect behaviour through legal 
prohibitions and by redefining rights and duties. Economists, by contrast, emphasize economic 
incentives, manipulating these so that the desired behaviour comes to be in the agent's 
self-interest. 
'SUPPLY SIDE' PROBLEMS OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
University research is often unsuitable for use by policy makers. It often takes much longer to 
produce results than a policy maker with a short deadline can tolerate. It is frequently highly 
critical, without positive suggestions for action, in keeping with the self-image of many 
academics as gadflies. It often avoids simple recommendations that can be acted upon and 
instead analyzes the advantages of various alternatives. There is also a tendency for some 
researchers to learn tools and techniques and then search for problems to apply them to. Streeten 
(1988, p.640) calls this "the law of the hammer according to which a boy, given a hammer, finds 
everything worth pounding, not only nails but also Ming vases". 
The state of social science research is such that consensus is rare. The incentives in academia are 
to question and overthrow existing theories and replace them with new ones. A state of 
conflicting views and information is therefore normal (Aaron, 1978) see note 2. This undermines 
the confidence of potential clients when they realize that for every study they examine, another 
can be found that provides opposite conclusions. Policy makers rightly judge that such research 
is more likely to complicate a debate than to resolve it (Weiss, 1977), and may even delay badly 
needed action in the face of conflicting advice (Aaron, 1978). 
Academics also tend to search for general laws and patterns of behaviour - these reveal 
phenomena of greater theoretical and long run importance than highly specific observations. 
Funding agencies favour this approach because it provides a greater return to the research dollar. 
Consultants also look for general lessons, since these can be applied to new assignments at little 
marginal cost (Szanton, 1981). Policy makers, however, are not interested in generalizations - 
they want answers to the specific problems they face, even though such 'small' problems may 
not attract the interest of researchers. 
Finally, the easiest kind of policy-oriented research is program evaluation. Policy makers are 
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generally more interested in forward-looking research, however. Evaluations may actually be 
counterproductive by provoking a defensive reaction from the object of study (Szanton, 1981). 
RESEARCH UTILIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The wealth of material on research utilization in the US is in contrast to its paucity in developing 
countries. This paper attempts to glean from the former literature generalizations applicable to at 
least some developing country situations. However, a number of provisos should be made. First 
and most obviously, the degree of openness in the political system in most LDC's (both 
openness to influence by the electorate and researchers, and openness to investigation) is more 
limited than in the US. However, in those cases where researchers are permitted to express their 
views on policy issues, the suggestions made subsequently about increasing the likelihood of 
utilization are applicable. In some countries, the probability may increase from 40 to 80%, in 
others from 4 to 8%, but the principle is the same. 
Second, data are scarcer and less reliable in LDCs. This will make'quick and dirty' policy 
analysis more difficult and may lead researchers either into basic data collection or into data-free 
theory and modelling. 
Third, in many LDCs, interest groups are less articulated than they are in industrialized countries 
and the demand for policy analysis from non-government clients is likely to be weaker. 
Fourth, while the overt role of domestic interest groups may be weak or repressed, the influence 
of external agencies like the IMF over policy making is far greater than in any developed 
country. However, this 'policy dialogue' may actually serve to increase government demand for 
research, as ammunition needed in negotiation. 
Fifth, in those societies where politics is highly ideological, researchers and research institutions 
tend to be similarly divided, often with explicit partisan affiliations. The process by which 
research influences policy resembles a lottery: a researcher can hit the jackpot if his or her party 
achieves power, but may then be quite marginalized during succeeding regimes. This 
phenomenon is common in Latin America. 
Sixth, cabinet ministers in LDC's often tend to be more technically competent for their portfolios 
than their counterparts in North America or Britain. In Canada, for example, ministers often hold 
very different portfolios during their careers and rely on their staff for technical expertise. In 
Latin America, it is not unusual for a sectoral minister to hold a PhD in the relevant discipline 
and thus be in a better position to make independent assessments of information see note 3. 
Similarly, casual observation suggests that cabinet ministers in some developing countries 
(again, Latin America provides the greatest number of observations) come from a wider variety 
of professional backgrounds than those in North America, where lawyers and businessmen 
predominate. One might expect the lesser weight of lawyers might make developing countries 
less prove to regulatory solutions, though the results do not seem to bear this out. 
Seventh, decision-making tends to be highly centralized, placing heavy burdens on a few key 
individuals. 
Eighth, administrative capacity for implementation is weaker, so the practical implications of 
any recommendation are critical. 
Finally, it has been observed that the distinction between the formulation and implementation of 
a policy may be quite difficult in developing countries (Fine, 1990). Particularly in negotiations 
with external agencies, an apparent agreement on a policy may be nothing more than the 
avoidance of overt disagreement. Only after funding is in place do the hard decisions start to be 
taken. As the effects of the policy change become visible, resistance mounts, involving conflicts 
among a larger number of actors at different levels and in different agencies (Thomas and 
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Grindle, 1990). This suggests that recommendations aimed simply at defining a desirable policy 
are unlikely to be effective; only if they are pursued throughout the implementation process will 
they stand a chance of success. 
GUIDELINES FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF RESEARCH 
UTILIZATION 
Many authors have made suggestions about the design and dissemination of social science 
research with the intention of increasing the likelihood of its utilization. Some authors have 
discussed the conditions under which utilization is most likely to occur; others have gone further 
in providing quite specific recommendations. Many of these flow logically from the diagnoses 
presented in previous sections of this paper. 
Weiss and Bucavalas (1977) found, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the quality of the 
research, including the reliability of its methodology, did have an important bearing on its 
credibility and impact. They also found that research that challenged existing assumptions and 
ways of doing things was not necessarily rejected and was often highly valued. 
Faulhaber and Baumol (1988) looked specifically at the conditions under which economic 
research is likely to be utilized. The adoption of economic methods or recommendations was 
mostly likely in the following circumstances: 
1. when they pertained to critical future decisions (e.g. forecasting techniques useful 
for investment in the stock market). 
2. in situations where competitive pressures are strong, and there are pressures as 
well as incentives to innovate. 
3. when a technique provides an accurate signalling function (e.g. a forecast that is 
not necessarily based on a correct diagnosis of underlying causes, but which itself 
influences expectations and behaviour). 
4. when an agency or firm is highly accountable and must justify the decisions it 
takes. 
5. when recommendations take into account their effects on income distribution. 
A number of authors have gone a step further and provided recommendations for the design and 
conduct of research. Szanton's (1981) studies of urban policy research in the US provided the 
following conclusions: 
1. Avoid explicit evaluations. Clients are more likely to respond to positive 
suggestions for change than to criticism of past performance. 
2. Give the client credit for successful innovations; he will certainly have to take the 
blame for failures. 
3. Don't try to develop complex methods on the job; stick to simple, tried and true 
ones. These are less risky and more comprehensible to the client. 
4. Try an experimental or pilot project to test a recommendation before proceeding 
to full-blown implementation. 
5. Aim for situation-specific solutions, not generalizable laws. Good solutions will 
eventually catch on. 
Verdier's (1984) paper is directed to would-be advisors to US congressmen. His ten 
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recommendations appear sensible for policy advisers in most situations. 
1. Learn about the history of the issue. By researching previous arguments, the 
analyst can identify key interest groups, areas of disagreement and data gaps, as 
well as changes in context that may influence future bargaining. 
2. Find out who will be making the decision. Target the recommendations to those 
groups and present them in a form appropriate to the audience. 
3. Timing is critical. Recommendations should be presented when they are most 
likely to receive attention. Generally, it is best to get into the debate early before 
positions harden. 
4. Learn everyone's interests and arguments. 
5. It's OK to think like an economist but don't write like one. Emphasize the 
decision at hand, the underlying problem, and options to solve it. Minimize 
methodology, jargon and equations. 
6. Keep it simple. Where it is essential to explain complex features of an issue, 
illustrate them simply, using examples where possible. 
7. Policy makers care more about distribution than efficiency. Explain what groups 
will be affected by the proposed measures, avoiding general references to 'welfare 
losses for the economy'. 
8. Take implementation and administration into account. Don't propose measures 
that are technically optimal but too complex or costly for an agency to administer. 
9. Emphasize a few crucial and striking numbers. Use statistics that emphasize the 
number of people affected, rather than aggregate dollar figures. 
10. Read the newspapers. More generally, try to gain access to the same sources of 
general information as the policy maker, since these sources influence their 
perceptions. 
Similarly, Leman and Nelson (1981) provide 'ten commandments for policy economists'. Those 
that do not duplicate Verdier's are: 
1. Be economical about the use of economics. Apply economic analysis only to 
problems where it is relevant. Emphasize basic economic principles. 
2. Discount for political demand. If the first-best solution is infeasible push for the 
second-best and make it as good as possible. 
3. Dare to be quick and dirty. Partial analysis is better than none. 
CLIENT-ORIENTED RESEARCH AND RESEARCH BROKERS 
Some authors who stress policy impact have gone farther than this and propose the development 
of a distinct type of inquiry: policy analysis. Behn (1981, p. 200) defined this activity as 
follows: 
the examination of a particular policy problem in an effort to determine what the 
government should do; usually but not always, it is prepared for a particular policy maker 
who wants to make, has to make, or is able to make a specific decision (or take a specific 
action) about the policy problem. 
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Policy analysis is action-oriented, aiming to produce specific changes and providing suggestions 
not only on the content of the change but also on how to achieve it. Assessments of political 
feasibility play an important role. Theoretical innovation, methodological rigour and primary 
data collection are downplayed, but the need to deal with political aspects adds different 
complexities. The challenges of conventional social science research and policy analysis are 
different; each style will appeal to different temperaments and many would argue that policy 
analysis is not a second best. As Behn (1985, p. 432) says, "many prefer the chess of policy 
analysis to the checkers of social science". 
In Behn's definition, the essential difference between a researcher and a policy analyst is that the 
latter has a particular user in mind for the research product and previous contact with the user. 
("If you don't have a client, you're not doing policy analysis": Behn, 1985, p. 428.) This view is 
controversial. If the implication is that the client must be situated within government, it is highly 
restrictive and eliminates much focused, applied research that is appropriately critical of 
government. At the least, one could argue that research carried out for non-government clients 
should be considered policy analysis. At most, one could argue that economists traditionally 
view society as a whole as their client when pointing out various inefficiencies, and that some 
see their role as defending the interests of unorganized but disadvantaged elements of the 
population. Research carried out in these circumstances, if it provides specific policy 
recommendations, might also be considered policy analysis. A better term for the approach 
advocated by Behn might be 'client-oriented research'. 
An alternative or supplement to the specialized policy analyst is the research broker who, instead 
of providing policy advice himself, acts as an intermediary between policy makers and the 
research community. The broker responds to a client's needs by seeking out needed information 
(or a researcher who could provide it); synthesizing and condensing information; and providing 
technical assistance to help the client interpret the data (Davis and Salasin, 1978). 
This role would be a difficult one to say the least. Brokers might be liable to the 'shoot the 
messenger' syndrome and could be used as convenient scapegoats for policy failures. They 
might also be pressured to suppress embarrassing reports and to tell clients what they want to 
hear (Sundquist, 1978). 
The precarious nature of the broker's existence has led some observers to doubt the feasibility of 
such an approach. The broker is an idea "off-touted and rarely instituted" (Weiss, 1978, p. 70); 
there are few cases to empirically evaluate. Some experimentation with this promising but risky 
idea would probably be useful. One could reduce the vulnerability of the position by having the 
broker funded by and perhaps reporting to an external funding agency; the advantage of the 
broker's greater autonomy might well outweigh the loss of commitment by policy makers to use 
a service they are not paying for. 
In practice, the main limiting factor may be the availability of suitable people to play the 
broker's role. The combination of technical skills, diplomacy, entrepreneurship and relative 
risk-indifference calls for an exceptional individual. 
CRITICISMS OF CLIENT-ORIENTED RESEARCH 
The client-oriented approach to utilization has a number of deficiencies. At the empirical level, 
it simply has not worked well. The great wave of studies surveyed in this paper were done 
largely to find out why such an enormous investment in policy-oriented research had been so 
rarely utilized. It is clear from Section 2 and 3 that the ways in which policy makers and 
researchers analyze information and make decisions are fundamentally different in many 
respects. It is not particularly useful to deny this problem and exhort researchers to 'try harder'. 
Some measures can certainly be taken to reduce the gap. The various guidelines cited earlier are 
not unhelpful. They are limited, however, by the need to apply them in varying circumstances. 
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Most of those listed earlier could just as easily been phrased as their opposites. For example: 
1. Make use of pilot projects before moving to full scale. 
vs.. 
'Seize the moment'. Go straight to implementation while the opportunity exists, including 
a monitoring and evaluation component. You may not get another chance. 
2. Be prepared to sell your proposal, from early discussion through to implementation. 
(Except in circumstances where your credibility will be greater if you are seen as 
detached.) 
3. Find out who's making a decision and target your results. (Except when it is a 
non-decision, resulting from unconscious, uncoordinated actions.) 
Clearly, what is needed is not more detailed lists of highly specific 'commandments', but the 
ability to make good judgements in specific and sometimes unique circumstances. 
At a more philosophical level, there are other problems with client-oriented research. Selecting 
the right client is obviously a critical decision, but how do you do it when you don't know in 
advance what results you will come up with? (see Section 2). If the client is an individual, how 
do you know that he or she will be in the same post when the research is completed? 
More fundamentally, how legitimate are the interests of any single client? Any given client is 
likely to have a partial view of its own needs, let alone those of society, and a weak 
understanding of the broader repercussions of satisfying those demands. Farmers may want 
more subsidies, cheaper credit or higher prices, but they are unlikely to calculate the effects on 
the fiscal deficit, farm employment, or inflation. Client-oriented research does not create an 
awareness of those conflicts, or an understanding of the broader social system and the legitimacy 
and interdependence of various interests within it. 
The question of time lags is probably more serious than the literature implies. The problems are 
not only the mechanical ones of coordination, but relate to the setting of research priorities. 
Except for extremely narrow topics, the research process is lengthy, while the demands of clients 
are immediate. Furthermore, the crises clients face are frequently the result of previous errors or 
of trends sent in motion some time ago, but whose effects are felt only now see note 4. A 
suitable slogan to illustrate the danger of this approach might be "Client-oriented research: 
tomorrow's solutions for yesterday's problems". 
ALTERNATIVE USES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
So far this paper has been relatively pessimistic about the utilization of social science research. 
The remainder of the paper is more optimistic. It contends that many of the negative assessments 
of research impact are based on a mis-specification of 'impact': using a broader definition, the 
utilization of social science research has in fact been considerable. 
The most frequent and most important way in which social science research actually affects 
policy seems to be through its effect, often slow and cumulative, on widely-used concepts and 
methods. This was the principal finding of a massive 1975 study of research utilization in the 
United States (reported in Weiss, 1978) and the observation seems to be more broadly 
applicable. The contribution of social science research is not so much in proposing specific 
solutions to already well-defined problems, but rather in defining the problems and providing an 
array of methods with which to analyse them. These can be extremely important contributions. 
"Determining what issues are discussed in the policy making process may be the single most 
powerful political act" (Seekins and Fawcett, 1986). 
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Several terms have coined to describe this more diffuse model of research utilization, in contrast 
to the highly focused, client-oriented approach described earlier. Pelz (1978) refers to conceptual 
vs. instrumental research; Weiss (1977) to enlightenment vs. social engineering; and Rich 
(1977) to knowledge for understanding vs. knowledge for action (summarized in Snell, 1983). 
Problem definition can take many forms. It can consist of detecting or imposing a pattern on 
data, for example, a trend toward worsening income distribution (Rein and White, 1977). As 
Weiss (1978, p. 31) points out, it can focus attention and "help to turn what were non-problems 
or private problems into policy issues (such as child abuse), help to convert existing policy 
issues into non-problems (e.g. marijuana use), (or) drastically revise the way that a society 
thinks about issues (e.g. acceptable rates of unemployment)". In developing countries, changing 
approaches to research on the informal sector have had a major influence on how that 
phenomenon has been viewed over the last twenty years. Once seen as an embarrassing 
symptom of backwardness to be eradicated, research led to a greater acceptance of the informal 
sector as legitimate, and more recently through de Soto's (1987) work, as a positive force for 
development. 
In fact, it could be argued that the most significant contribution of social science research is at 
the most general level, in the generation of ideas and ideologies. History shows that ideas can be 
very powerful. The writings of Raul Prebisch had a tremendous influence on Latin American 
policy makers and led directly to the wave of import substitution that transformed the continent's 
economic structure in the fifties and sixties. The subsequent implementation of conservative 
policies had equally far-reaching effects and was also strongly influenced by the intellectual 
currents of the day. In both cases, ideas took root in an environment and a time when policy 
makers were receptive to them. 
All of these approaches to problem definition contribute to what Verdier (1984) calls 'structuring 
the terms of the debate'. This can include setting the agenda (for example, predicting long term 
trends that will eventually require the attention of policy makers or putting forward specific 
problems for discussion) and subsequently, injecting into that debate certain concepts and 
methods used in social science. Concepts like 'marginalization' made their way into policy 
discussion from social science literature; so did analytical methods for appraisal and evaluation. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH FUNDING AGENCIES 
What does all this imply for agencies financing research in developing countries? 
First, one should recognize that the likelihood of utilization of any kind of research (social or 
technical, instrumental or conceptual) is quite small. Furthermore, while the impact of 
instrumental research is limited it is highly identifiable; the impact of new concepts and problem 
identification is far-reaching but difficult to attribute. Furthermore, there are rarely total victories 
or losses in any policy arena and policies are frequently reversed or eroded with changes in 
personnel or circumstance. In some areas, such as tax reform, continuous revision rather than 
once-and-for-all change seems to be the rule (e.g. Perry and Cardenas, 1986). This also 
complicates the identification of research impact: what appears to be a strong impact in the short 
run may be eroded in the long run, while basic research which illuminates certain constant 
relationships may be drawn on years later to support or justify a policy change. 
An approach which creates the conditions for both kinds of impact is desirable. This could 
involve a portfolio approach, financing a variety of projects, each intended to produce a different 
type of impact. Alternatively, it is possible to finance long term research programs from which 
both conceptual and instrumental impacts can be derived. 
The content of such research should be such that it creates an understanding of basic behavioural 
relationships and a thorough knowledge of existing data and data sources. Research agenda that 
lead to such knowledge and that deal with long-term issues that have short-term implications can 
be tapped to provide short-term policy advice. An example is a multi-year research program 
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financed by IDRC in Latin America since 1983, examining savings and investment behaviour 
and the functioning of financial markets see note 5. Knowledge gained through this research has 
frequently been applied in policy recommendations related to management of inflation, capital 
flight, and wage and price policies. 
Similarly, a multi-phase network on debt bargaining see note 6 has yielded both 'instrumental' 
impact (progress in the adoption of recommendations about provisioning requirements for 
commercial banks) and 'conceptual' impact (by reinforcing general principles about 
cross-conditionality, no net transfers by least developed countries and so on). In the former case, 
it is relatively easy to trace a policy change back to a specific recommendation and to claim 
credit for it. In the latter, the researchers contribute to an ongoing debate; their contribution is 
partial and less identifiable. In the long run, however, the acceptance of broad principles may 
have greater effect on the debt problem. Both types of impact are valuable, so we need an 
approach that does not rule out one or the other a priori. While short term impacts can be 
derived from long term research programs, conceptual innovations rarely result from highly 
specific, client-oriented projects. It is this asymmetry which makes the case for program support 
a powerful one. 
The literature on policy analysis also gives some suggestions about research approaches that are 
most likely to influence policy. For example, traditional economics is probably not adequate. 
Something like the style of policy analysis advocated by Richard Behn is probably more 
suitable, without the single-client orientation. 
Many of the limitations of economics could be mitigated by paying attention to factors which 
affect the feasibility of implementation. One of the traditional role of economics in identifying 
specific inefficiencies, their costs, and who pays them, should receive more emphasis. This need 
not imply that quantitative economic criteria are overriding, but that the costs of tradeoffs, where 
estimable, are made explicit. For example, countries may deliberately choose to forego the 
putative efficiency benefits of trade liberalization in return for greater cultural or political 
autonomy. It helps in making such a decision, however, to know if the price of such autonomy is 
2% of GDP or 20%. 
In addition, economists should extend their analysis into the implementation phase. In making 
policy recommendations, they should not stop at recommending the first-best technical solution, 
but rather present a variety of ranked options, indicating the efficiency and distributional 
consequences of each. Who are the winners and losers in each scenario? It may be possible to 
design instruments to compensate the losers (rather than simply saying that efficiency gains will 
be sufficient that they could, in theory, be compensated). It may also be possible to map out 
alternative sequences of policy implementation, so that the introduction of measures in sequence 
progressively neutralizes opponents and strengthens supporters. Improvements in modelling and 
computer techniques are making this increasingly feasible. 
This style of research is not common, and there may be a need for specific graduate training to 
meet this need. Since researchers comfortable with interdisciplinary methods are scarce, there 
may at times be a need for multidisciplinary teams from economics, political science and/or 
public administration. This approach also requires knowledge of the history and evolution of 
policy issues and familiarity with the institutional context and decision-making process of 
government. These cannot be acquired through short-term projects done by individuals; the 
earlier recommendation of greater reliance on program grants is thus reinforced. 
Another process which needs some rethinking is the setting of research agenda. There is 
currently a fixation on the part of policy makers and donors with problem solving. This is 
understandable, but we often forget that there are other ways of dealing with problems, 
principally by avoiding them in the first place. Too often 'problem-oriented research' means 
trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together. One of the most important roles of research is to 
alert policy makers and others to incipient trends, so that they can take appropriate action before 
it is too late. Those trends can contain opportunities as well as dangers. It can be argued that one 
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of the reasons the Asian NIC's have done well, at a time when others have done poorly, is that 
they have anticipated problems and taken advantage of opportunities, rather than simply 
responding to crises. 
Donors have an important role to play in supporting theoretical research, though they are often 
reluctant to do so. They should recognize that the distinction between "theoretical" and 
"empirical" is in no sense equivalent to "useless" and "useful". Theoretical research can be 
extremely useful. A plausible, verifiable theory about how peasants respond to increases in crop 
prices, or savings to changes in interest rates is of obvious relevance to poverty and can be 
extremely useful. On the other hand, the collection of masses of data on an irrelevant topic 
benefits no one except computer manufacturers. The aim should be to support practical, 
applicable research, be it theoretical or empirical, rather than applied research per se. 
It is sometimes argued that donors should prefer to support government agencies rather than 
universities or private centres, in order to increase the likelihood of impact. The reverse also 
could be argued: that, non-government research centres may have bettter trained people with 
more time for research, are less likely to have their findings 'smothered' and less prone to 
shifting their stance with the government of the day. 
Neither generalization is likely to be robust. Policy impact can best be achieved by adapting the 
process of consultation to local circumstances. Often this consists of the formation of teams of 
researchers from government and academia; formation of inter-institutional steering committees 
(to provide direction for university research); frequent consultations and seminars with policy 
makers; training of government officials by academics; and so on. The flexible application of 
mechanisms such as these is likely a more effective means of increasing the probability of 
utilization than a priori decisions about institutional affiliation. 
Whatever kinds of institutions and mechanisms are supported, greater attention should go to 
dissemination. Donors should be prepared to pay the costs of those 'frills' which enhance the 
quality and utilization of research: training, networking, replication of studies, and dissemination 
of results through conferences, books, working papers, abstracts and the like. The familiar 
'project cycle' syndrome must also be broken, whereby researchers have an interest in finishing a 
project quickly in order to get on to the next income-earning activity, while donors want to 
finish it in order to close the books and begin the job of spending next year's budget. Follow-up 
activities which refine, repackage and disseminate results to different audiences should be seen 
as legitimate and important, often more so than new data collection exercises. The various 
'commandments' in Section 6 may be useful to researchers making their first forays into policy 
advice, and the mechanism of a'research broker' is worth experimenting with. 
In general, the literature should caution donors against excessive risk-aversion or emphasis on 
purely instrumental research. This is at least as true for developing countries as for developed 
ones. Particularly important is the role of research that detects and analyzes trends (e.g. the 
implications of new materials and technologies for primary commodity exporters; developments 
in global financial markets; issues likely to arise in global negotiation over climate change). 
Also important is the contribution of research to problem definition. Over the last decade, there 
has been a wave of interest in increasing the role of the market. This has complicated the role of 
policy analysis, since it is increasingly difficult to distinguish ends from means. Many changes 
that seem most appropriately to be viewed as means (e.g. privatization) have come to be seen as 
ends in themselves. In such conditions, the fundamental role of research in defining problems 
and setting the terms of the debate becomes even more crucial. 
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NOTES 
1. As Hartle (1979) puts it, "[Cabinet] ministers are like undertakers: they are paid to 
disguise what everyone knows to be painfully true". 
2. It is thus a mis-specification to refer to academic research as "supply-driven"; it simply 
responds to a different set of demands and incentives than client-oriented research. 
3. This underscores the importance of de Pablo's (1988) advice to would-be Ministers of 
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the Economy: "Never assume that the failures of your predecessors were the result of 
incompetence". 
4. This problem is even more severe for technology-oriented research than policy 
research, since lead times in the former tend to be even longer (Lipton, 1989). 
5. The participating research centres in this program are FEDESARROLLO (Colombia), 
PUC (Rio de Janeiro), CEDES (Argentina), CIEPLAN (Chile), Universidad Catolica 
(Bolivia). See Ahorro y Inversion en Latinoamerica, IDRC: MR207s, Ottawa, 1988. 
6. S. Griffith-Jones, ed. Managing World Debt. (Wheatsheaf, 1988). 
7. E. Rodriguez and S. Griffith-Jones, ed. Tangled Webs: Cross Conditionality, 
Banking Regulation and Third World Debt. (Macmillan, forthcoming). 
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